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1 Introduction
“How the patient followed the doctor’s orders” is the subtitle of a seminal paper by R.W.
HAHN (1989) who chronicled the experience with both tradable permits as well as emission
charges up to the late eighties in the U.S. and Europe. He showed that at this time some
countries had made first attempts to include these incentive oriented instruments but that the
actual use of these tools departed “from the role which economists have conceived for them”
(p. 96.). Already earlier a literature started which tried to answer the somewhat changed ques-
tion of “Why did the patient not follow the doctor’s orders?”, i.e. it tried to explain why de-
spite of the many papers and books written by environmental economists in favour of market
based instruments the actual environmental policy still mainly uses the ‘bureaucratic instru-
ments’ of command and control. There are at least three groups of arguments which are given
as possible reasons:
(i) Some authors have principal objections against the neo-classical model and/or the con-
cept of the homo economicus behind it. They see a possible alternative in the concept of
ecological economics.
1)  
(ii) Some authors have no objections against the neo-classical approach or against the model
of the homo economicus per se, but against the assumption of (pure) self-interest usually
employed.
2) They argue that politicians hesitate to apply environmental policy instru-
ments which use (monetary) incentives because these might crowd out environmental
ethics which is necessary in other areas of environmental policy.
(iii) Most authors use a Public Choice approach to explain why the application of incentive
oriented instruments in environmental policy is neither in the interest of the public bu-
reaucrats nor of the industries to be regulated.
3) If any instrument of environmental policy
is used at all, both groups of actors have much stronger interests in applying traditional
bureaucratic measures. 
Out of these three groups, only the third one provides really convincing arguments which may
explain the failure to introduce a market oriented environmental policy: 
(i) The first group of authors are not only hardly convincing with their arguments, they use
also – at least partly – contradictory arguments. It is true that ecological economics in
using the concept of sustainability places more emphasis on ‘natural’ constraints of the
                                                          
1. See, e.g., F. SÖLLNER (1993).
2. See, e.g., S. KELMAN (1981), H. WECK-HANNEMANN  and B.S. FREY (1995), B.S. FREY and F. OBER-
HOLZER-GEE (1996), or – more generally – F. HIRSCH (1976).
3. This approach goes back to B.S. FREY (1972, pp. 134ff.) and J. BUCHANAN and G. TULLOCK (1975). More
recent papers are, e.g., P.B. DOWNING (1991), H.W. URSPRUNG (1992), B. DIJKSTRA and A. NENTJES
(1994), E. GAWEL (1994), G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1994, pp. 479ff.), H. WECK-HANNEMANN (1994), K.W.
ZIMMERMANN (1996), F. SCHNEIDER (1997), or F. SCHNEIDER and J. VOLKERT (1999). Papers which apply
this approach to international environmental problems are, e.g., A.L. HILLMAN and H. URSPRUNG (1994),
R.D. CONGLETON (1995), A. MICHAELOWA (1998) or A. ENDRES and M. FINUS (2000). See also W.E.
OATES and P.R. PORTNEY (2001) for a review of the literature on the political determination of environ-
mental regulation.– 3 –
29.05.02; C:\Studien\PolEcEnvPol3a.doc 3
economic process than traditional environmental economics. The concept of sustainabi-
lity can, however, be incorporated into models of (neoclassical) environmental economics
without any problems. This can be done, e.g., by adding constraints to a growth model
which restrict the available energy and/or the absorption capacity of the ‘space ship earth’
for waste.
4) Thus, there is no systematic difference between these two areas in this re-
spect.
5) Moreover, when it comes to the discussion of environmental policy, many of the
authors who see themselves as ecological economists demand the use of environmental
taxes according to the standard-price-approach of W.J. BAUMOL and W.E. OATES (1971),
an approach which is clearly in the ‘neoclassical’ tradition.
6) In addition, there are no new
instruments which have been proposed by the authors belonging to this group which have
not yet been proposed before by traditional environmental economists. Thus, whatever
the merits of this approach might be, it fails to explain why market based environmental
instruments had only so few opportunities in the past to become part of environmental
policy programs.
(ii) Secondly, the idea that market based environmental policy instruments have so far not
been applied because of the anxiety that they might crowd out intrinsic motivation which
is necessary to preserve the environment is also not very convincing. It is true that until
the eighties environmental groups used such arguments: they argued against a ‘commer-
cialisation’ of the environment and demanded bureaucratic instruments. However, the
situation has changed; today these groups demand the use of market-based instruments,
especially of ‘ecological taxes’. There has been some use of such taxes in several coun-
tries in recent years, especially in small European countries. However, in most of these
countries environmental groups are not strong enough to substantially change their na-
tional environmental policy. Moreover, the argument itself is hardly convincing. Intrinsic
motivation can play a role for ‘low-cost-decisions’.
7) But the really important production
and consumption decisions which have an environmental impact and could be influenced
by environmental policy do not belong to this category.
8) In these situations, moral argu-
ments which could refer to intrinsic motivation do – at best – have an alibi function. On
the other hand, where intrinsic motivation can play a role to protect the environment eco-
nomic instruments are hardly applicable. (The same holds for bureaucratic instruments.)
Thus, even if we accept the theoretical possibility of a crowding out of intrinsic motiva-
tion by instruments which provide monetary incentives this can hardly be expected to
have much relevance in the area of environmental policy. Moreover, at least according to
B.S. FREY (1997, p. 69), the possibility of a crowding out of intrinsic motivation is higher
                                                          
4. For an early such model see, e.g., K.E. BOULDING (1966). – As H.E. GOELLER and A.M. WEIBERG (1976)
show, energy and not, e.g., mineral resources is the truly limiting factor for economic development.
5. For a discussion of the relation between ecological and (traditional) environmental economics see, e.g., G.
KIRCHGÄSSNER (1997).
6. See, e.g., J. MINSCH et al. (1996, pp. 214ff.)
7. For (first steps towards) a theory of low-cost decisions see G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1992) as well as G. KIRCH-
GÄSSNER and W.W. POMMEREHNE (1993). For a more extensive discussion of intrinsic (moral) behaviour
in environmental issues see G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2000).
8. See for this also E. GAWEL (2001).– 4 –
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if bureaucratic instruments than if market based instruments are used because the latter
are not only – in most cases – more efficient – but they give also the individuals more
freedom of choice. Thus, if it has any effect at all, the substitution of bureaucratic by
market based instruments should crowd in and not crowd out intrinsic motivation to pro-
tect the environment.
(iii) Thus, if market based instruments are not used at all or at least to a much lesser extent
than most environmental (and ecological) economists demand, the reason might be that
the main actors of environmental policy, especially the bureaucrats in environmental
protection agencies and the managers of the relevant industries have a much stronger in-
terest to apply traditional bureaucratic measures. This is exactly what the Public Choice
approach tries to show. And, as it will be demonstrated below, it offers more convincing
arguments for the situation of today’s environmental policy.
However, while most papers dealing with these problems analyse the past development, they
overlook the more recent one. First, while there is still hardly any use of tradable permits in
environmental policy outside the United States, the use inside the U.S. has considerably in-
creased during the last decade.
9) Moreover, as W.E. Oates (2000) shows, the application of
cost-benefit-analyses to evaluate environmental policies has also increased considerably. Sec-
ond, there has been an increasing number of countries in Europe which use environmental
taxes, especially energy taxes. And while several smaller countries (like the Scandinavian
countries and the Netherlands) started with this policy, in recent years two major European
countries, the United Kingdom and Germany, joined this group.
10) Thus, even if the general
level is still low, there is much more use today of environmental taxes than at the end of the
eighties when R.W. HAHN (1989) wrote his famous paper.
11) Third, in the Kyoto process, in-
ternationally tradable permits were intended to play a major role in international environ-
mental policy, together with other (but related) market based instruments like ‘Joint Imple-
mentation’ and ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ projects. Thus, on the international level
there seems to be an increasing willingness to apply market based instruments. The question
is: What has changed since the eighties so that the application of such instruments seems to be
more acceptable today than it was in the eighties?
Moreover, a new class of instruments has been introduced which are (at least in the political
discourse) often also labelled ‘economic instruments’: ‘voluntary agreements’. They are be-
coming more and more popular, despite the fact that the empirical evidence of their efficiency
                                                          
9. For the experience in the United States with such a programme see B. HANSJÜRGENS (1998), P.L. JOSKOW,
R. SCHMALENSEE, and E.M. BAILEY (1998), A. DENNY ALLERMANN et al. (2000) or R. STAVINS (2002).
For a general evaluation of U.S. environmental policy see A.M. FREEMAN III (2002).
10. For the more recent experience in the United Kingdom see T. SECOMBE-HETT (2000).
11. Taxes on energy, especially on mineral oil, have, of course, long been levied in many countries, especially
European countries. These taxes certainly had the ecological impact of reducing energy consumption.
However, this was only a positive – and often non-intended – side effect; the reason why these taxes have
been introduced and continuously increased is to create public revenue for general and/or for specific traffic
purposes like the construction of motorways in Switzerland.– 5 –
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is hardly convincing.
12) In Switzerland, e.g., they are an integral part of the federal law to re-
duce CO2-emissions which was passed in 1999.
Thus, while we are still far away from general acceptance and widespread application of mar-
ket based environmental instruments, the situation has changed at least somewhat, and we
must ask whether the old diagnosis given by R.W. HAHN (1989) and the papers in the Public
Choice tradition still holds or what the reasons are for the (partly) new development and the
wider acceptance of these instruments. To give some answers to these questions is the pur-
pose of this paper. To do so, we first present the main ideas of the Public Choice approach
(Section 2). In Section 3 we discuss recent applications of traditional market based instru-
ments, environmental taxes and tradable permits as well as the increasing use of voluntary
agreements. Taking all arguments together, we have to conclude in Section 4 that, despite the
fact that the use of market based instruments in environmental policy has somewhat increased
in recent years, their impact on the actual situation of the environment is still rather modest. If
they are employed (or proposed), this is often done for other purposes, and some instruments
which are labelled ‘market based instruments’ are in no way such instruments: the main pur-
pose of their use is to prevent the use of effective instruments of environmental policy. Thus,
with some minor revisions, the results of the Public Choice approach still hold, but there is
also some hope that the use of incentive oriented instruments in environmental policy will at
least somewhat increase in the future.
2 The Public Choice Approach to Environmental Policy
The usual way to proceed in the papers which follow the Public Choice approach is to single
out the different (groups of) actors which are engaged in environmental policy making and to
ask for their interests in the application of the different instruments which could be applied.
Following B.S. FREY (1972, pp. 134ff.), typically, four groups of actors are considered: (i) the
voters, (ii) the politicians, (iii) the public bureaucrats, and (iv) the ‘economy’, i.e. the owners,
managers and employees of the industries which are to be regulated and their interest groups.
In the following, we will give a short characterisation of the main interests of these four
groups of actors in environmental policy.
2.1 The Voters
Over the last three decades, the sensitivity of voters with respect to environmental issues has
certainly increased.
13) Thus, the approval of voters of ecologically sustainable policies should
become more and more probable. However, it should be taken into account that ecological
objectives ‘compete’ with other interests, especially with ‘pure’ economic objectives of the
voters. 
                                                          
12. See, e.g., K. RENNINGS, K.L. BROCKMANN and H. BERGMANN (1997).
13. See, e.g., the results of the IMAS-surveys for Austria (IMAS (1995, 1996)) or the results for Germany pre-
sented in J. HORBACH (1992). – 6 –
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Assuming that the improvement of the environmental quality is a national (or, as in the case
of the reduction of CO2-emissions, even an international) public good, the most relevant
question regarding the behaviour of voters is: Who will pay the costs? If the price elasticity of
demand is low and/or if the supply elasticity is infinitely elastic, as in the case of mineral oil
prices in small countries, where the consumer price of these products is determined by the
prices on the international spot markets,
14) the consumers have to bear the costs. This implies
that the majority of voters directly pays for such a policy. But if price elasticity is high, only a
small part of the burden of an environmental measure which increases the production costs of
a good can be passed on to the consumers. Thus, the producers, shareholders, managers as
well as workers of these firms, have to bear the costs. Consequently, the resistance to environ-
mental programs might be higher in regions with a high share of producer interests which op-
pose such a policy, because a higher burden can lead to reduced profits, wages and employ-
ment in these regions.
In Germany, empirical evidence for such a trade-off between the reduction of unemployment
and ecological objectives was found. J. HORBACH (1992) shows that in regions with a high
unemployment rate the Green Party receives fewer votes in elections than in other regions.
Moreover, he also shows that the more important the chemical and steel industries are in a
certain region, the worse the election chances are for this party, because its ecologically ori-
ented economic policy program might weaken the position of these industries. Thus, citizens
voting out of self-interest might be an obstacle for the approval of any kind of environmental
policy. This implies that too little might be done, especially in those regions where environ-
mental policy is needed most.
New arguments have emerged in the recent international discussion of the double dividend.
The implementation of incentive oriented environmental tax policies need not be accompa-
nied by an increase of the tax burden but can also be realised through a shift in the tax burden.
In such a case there is no immediate trade-off between fighting unemployment and enforcing
stricter environmental policies. On the contrary, many simulations show that it might even be
possible to have a small gain in employment.
15) As a study of the OECD (1997) shows, a
large number of winners among different economic sectors and firms might be generated, but
with only small gains. On the other hand, there would be a few distinct losers among the firms
whose economic position could deteriorate quite substantially. Thus, at first sight, politicians
might be expected to enact such a tax alternative in response to the preferences of the majority
of voters instead of caring for the minority of losers. However, as Public Choice theory tells
us, “ ... a small concentrated identifiable, and intensely interested pressure group may exert
more influence on political choice making than the much larger majority of persons, each of
whom might expect to secure benefits in the second order of smalls ...”
16) Thus, even if a dou
                                                          
14. See, e.g., G. KIRCHGÄSSNER and K. KÜBLER (1992) for Germany and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1994) for Swit-
zerland.
15. See, e.g., the review of such studies in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998), F. SCHNEIDER and A.M. STIGLBAUER
(1995) or F. SCHNEIDER (1998) with results for Austria, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER, U. MÜLLER and M.R. SAVIOZ
(1998) with results for Switzerland or H. KOSCHEL, A. WÜNSCHE and T. ECKERLE (1999) as well as CH.M.
SCHOLZ (2000) with results for Germany. 
16. J.M. BUCHANAN and G. TULLOCK (1975, p. 142).– 7 –
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ble dividend allows to fight unemployment by enforcing stricter environmental policies in the
economy as a whole there still can exist a political trade-off between fighting unemployment
in small, intensely interested, and highly influential pressure groups of potential losers and an
incentive based environmental policy.
17) 
However, the case of a double dividend where employment is rising with a stricter environ-
mental policy is an exception in environmental policy making, which to a large extent de-
pends on the existence of involuntary unemployment.
18) In most situations there is a trade-off
between the production of better environmental quality and the production of consumer
goods, i.e. the voters have to make a choice between better environmental quality and higher
real income. In such situations, the decision of voters depends on the information of the citi-
zens about the consequences of environmental problems, the lag between the time when the
policy measure is taken and the time when the environmental situation improves, and the dis-
count rate of voters. Especially with respect to measures which are mainly to the benefit of
future generations, self-interested individuals would generally not be willing to bear high
costs. This is one of the main obstacles against efficient CO2-reduction policies. But similar
conditions hold in other areas of environmental policymaking as well. Consequently, it can be
expected that in many cases voters care more about the economic short-term development
than about the environmental situation. This might delay or even prevent the approval of
ecologically-oriented politics by the majority of voters. Even if a citizen is to some extent al-
truistic, well-educated and -informed it is not obvious that she/he as a ‘rational’ (even long-
term oriented) voter will support ecologically oriented economic policies in elections or refer-
enda.
19) 
This can lead to an undersupply of such policies. It should, however, not lead to the introduc-
tion of inefficient environmental policies. Thus, it is difficult to explain why voters should be
in favour of command and control instead of market oriented environmental policies. Never-
theless, voters seem to prefer a policy of regulations and prohibitions. One of the reasons for
this could be that the costs of the traditional policy are less visible than the costs of market
oriented policies. Insofar, there might be a kind of cost-illusion, i.e. voters may have the im-
pression that an improvement of the environment could be reached by means of regulations
and prohibitions without costs, i.e. without reducing the income of the average citizen. How-
ever, this argument is strikingly at odds which the assumption of rational expectations which
is usually used in Economics (and Public Choice theory as well) and which is assumed to hold
at least in the long-run. Moreover, if voters behave rationally, political entrepreneurs should
be able to overcome this illusion. Thus, voters might be (partly) responsible for the undersup-
ply of environmental policies, but they can hardly be held responsible for the lack of market
oriented measures in this policy.
                                                          
17. This does not only hold in representative democracies but also in direct democratic systems, as the referen-
dum in Switzerland on September 24, 2000, shows, when such a reform was rejected by the voters with a
majority of 54 percent. At this occasion, the potentially losing industries invested quite a lot of money into
their campaign.
18. See, the corresponding simulation results in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER, U. MÜLLER and M.R. SAVIOZ (1998).
19. The role of altruistic/moral behaviour in such decisions is discussed in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2000).– 8 –
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2.2 The Politicians
Politicians can be assumed to pursue a certain policy if – given that they achieve their objec-
tive – it is supported by a majority of voters, under the qualification that there is no consider-
able resistance from neither the bureaucracy nor the interest groups. Insofar, if voters accept
or even demand an undersupply of environmental policies, a government which wants to
maximise its re-election probability gets no incentive from the voters to provide a better envi-
ronmental quality. 
However, even a democratic government is hardly ever only seeking re-election. According to
the partisan hypothesis first developed by D. HIBBS (1977; see also 1992) and incorporated
into the politico-economic models of B.S. FREY and F. SCHNEIDER (1978, 1978a, 1979) re-
election is more of a constraint which the government has to respect than an objective in it-
self. Thus, if a coalition government includes a ‘green’ party and/or if the dominating party of
the government has a clientele which has an especially strong environmental orientation a
government might provide a stronger environmental policy than it is demanded by the voters
altogether (the median voter) as long as this does not endanger its re-election prospects.
20) On
the other hand, if the clientele of the government is more economically oriented it will hardly
accept that the output of consumer goods is reduced in order to improve environmental qual-
ity. Thus, there might be a less strict environmental policy than is demanded by the median
voter. 
Even if the level of environmental activities is (on the average) too low, the question again
arises whether the remaining policies in this field are carried out in an efficient way. If there is
no pressure by the voters but if they are, instead, in favour of more visible but less efficient
policies, the use of bureaucratic instruments might be more in the interest of politicians than
the use of economic instruments. However, there are two qualifications to be made. First, be-
cause the government should be better informed than the average voter, it should take into ac-
count that the higher efficiency of an environmental policy which uses economic instruments
allows to use resources for other purposes and – in this way – to satisfy more of the demands
of the own clientele and/or to improve the re-election prospects. For this reason, the govern-
ment should – ceteris paribus – be more in favour of applying economic instruments than the
average voter. 
Second, environmental taxes might have a special attraction for governments because they
create revenue which can be used to cut other taxes and/or to finance additional projects. This
can be advantageous for the government if the tax resistance against ‘green taxes’ can be ex
                                                          
20. In the typical European political system where the government is elected by a majority of the parliament
the parliamentarians have nearly the same interests as the government. Thus, we only discuss the role of the
government. This situation is different in the U.S. where the election of the government is independent
from the elections of the members of the congress and in Switzerland where – according to the system of
half-direct democracy at the federal level – the government is actually quite independent from the parlia-
ment. In both countries, each single member of the parliament has much more independence from the offi-
cial line of their party than their colleagues in the representative systems of the other European democra-
cies. Consequently, they are closer to the citizens of their constituencies and, therefore, there is also much
wider variation in the environmental policy they favour.– 9 –
29.05.02; C:\Studien\PolEcEnvPol3a.doc 9
pected to be lower than against other taxes. This holds especially if the clientele of the gov-
ernment is more environmentally oriented than the average voter.
21) On the other hand, as the
opposition will try to use its chance and to make strong claims against introducing or raising
such visible taxes the leeway of a government to pursue such a policy is limited.
It is, moreover, possible to present environmental taxes as acceptable measures to the voters,
if these taxes are characterised as ‘punishment’ for polluting the environment and if they are
applied mainly to industrial polluters. Politically, it might be more difficult to sell the creation
of a market for tradable permits to the voters because these can be considered as ‘licences to
pollute the environment’ which – from a moral point of view – might be seen as morally un-
sound by those people who are especially strongly engaged for the natural environment.
22)
Moreover, at least as long as grandfathering is used as the method for the original distribution
of the emission rights, the government is much less interested in using tradable permits than
in using ecological taxes.
Taking all these arguments together, the interests of the government might in the average lead
to a less than optimal level of environmental policy, but – as with the voters – they can hardly
be the reason why the use of market oriented environmental instruments was on such a low
level in the past. Therefore, those who really oppose such a policy must be the public bu-
reaucracy and/or private business, i.e. the regulated industries and their interest groups.
23)
2.3 The Regulated Industries and Their Interest Groups
Officially, representatives of the industries which are to be regulated by environmental policy
are much in favour of economic instruments. But whenever the application of such instru-
ments is discussed, they are at least very hesitant and in most cases in strong opposition to
such a policy. If, e.g., ecological taxes are discussed, they argue against it and instead favour
voluntary agreements which, as will be shown below, are just the opposite of an economic in-
strument of environmental policy, command and control policies or – at the most – tradable
permits.
24) For the latter, however, they demand grandfathering of the original distribution of
the emission rights. Thus, if there are any economic instruments used at all, besides subsidies
which are not discussed here, the regulated industries prefer tradable permits which are dis-
tributed by grandfathering. In any case, they prefer a policy of command and control to a
policy applying ecological taxes.
25)
                                                          
21. Acknowledging this, several opponents against the introduction of environmental taxes do not really argue
against the use of environmental taxes per se but they are anxious that, given the less severe tax resistance,
the government might be successful in increasing the total tax load. See, e.g., K.W. ZIMMERMANN (1996).
22. For a discussion of ethical aspects of international emissions trading see H.E. OTT and W. SACHS (2000).
23. Additional arguments why a government might prefer taxes to tradable permits are given in J. HAUCAP and
R. KIRSTEIN (2002). 
24. See J. HORBACH  (1992) who shows that two thirds of the German companies favour standards whereas
only one third favours levies and taxes.
25. There are some producer organisations which are in favour of environmental policy and which support the
use of environmental taxes, like the ÖBU (Swiss Association for Environmentally Conscious Management;
Schweizerische Vereinigung für ökologisch bewusste Unternehmensführung) in Switzerland. However, the– 10 –
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But why should the polluters, especially the industrial polluters, oppose the use of market ori-
ented environmental policy instruments? After all, using these instruments the same ecologi-
cal impact could be reached ‘more cheaply’ i.e. at lower costs, which finally should be in the
interest of the relevant industrial sectors as well. It is obvious that the profit interest of any
single producer which has a relevant amount of emissions is against any environmental regu-
lation because it reduces its expected profits. But why is there a quite special opposition
against economic measures of environmental policy?
The two main reasons for this opposition are probably the high efficiency of such a policy and
distributional questions.
(i) At the level of the economy as a whole, the high efficiency of economic instruments
means that the aspired ecological objectives can be reached with minimal (social) costs.
For the single firm, however, the situation is quite different. As long as a policy of com-
mand and control is pursued, it has a (sometimes considerable) leeway for negotiations
with its environmental protection agency. In these negotiations it has an informational
advantage; it knows the processes and the potential costs if the emissions have to be re-
duced by a certain amount, and it can threat with a reduction of employment or even with
the displacement of the firm if the regulations are too strict. On the other hand, if envi-
ronmental taxes are used, the firm can pollute as much as it wants, but it has to pay for it.
Reductions of a tariff which has been fixed in the parliament and written into a law are
much more difficult to negotiate than the extent of a regulation which is necessarily –
more or less – individual for each firm. Thus, it can be expected that the regulation will –
on the average – be less strict with a command and control policy than if economic in-
struments of environmental policy are used.
(ii) There are also, however, important distributional consequences. Let us assume that the
firm uses the same technology and has the same emission in both regimes, under a com-
mand and control and under an economically oriented environmental policy. Thus, at the
margin everything is the same, the same technology, the same marginal costs, and the
same prices of the goods produced. Moreover, the costs for reducing the emissions are
the same. Inframarginally however, if taxes or tradable permits are used the firm has to
pay for its emissions while under a policy of command and control it gets them for free.
Thus, to the extent of the legal emissions it gets an additional rent.
26) If wages are given,
this rent can be appropriated by the owners. However, the employees (and/or their or-
ganisations, the trade unions) will realise that there is a possibility for a wage increase;
they will demand their share of this rent. On the other hand, if taxes are used (and the
revenue is used to cut other taxes, e.g.,) the general public benefits. Thus, shareholders
                                                                                                                                                                                    
members of these associations represent often companies which have only few emissions and which are,
therefore, affected by environmental policy only to a small extent. 
26. This argument has first been put forward by J.M. BUCHANAN and G. TULLOCK (1975). More recently, T.S.
AIDT (1998) presents a model where lobbying of interest groups forces the government to select an efficient
tax instrument. However, he does not compare (efficient) taxes with (inefficient) command and control
measures, but only (inefficient) output with (efficient) resource taxes. Moreover, for the resulting political
equilibrium being optimal it is necessary that all interests are organised in lobby groups (with equal politi-
cal power).– 11 –
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(employers) as well as employees have an interest to prevent the use of economic instru-
ments.
A similar argument holds if we compare grandfathering with auctioning tradable permits.
If there is competition, at the margin both systems lead to the same condition. That im-
plies that the prices for the goods produced will be the same. If the permits are auctioned,
there is an additional revenue for the government which can be used to cut other taxes
and which – in this way – may be to the benefit of the general public. If grandfathering is
used, however, as, e.g., in the case of the sulfur dioxide allowance-trading program in the
United States,
27) the existing firms get an additional rent. Moreover, they get a competi-
tive advantage against newcomers in the market who do not get this rent because they
have to pay for all the permits they need: grandfathering of pollution rights creates a bar-
rier to entry against new firms. Thus, it is no surprise that the existing companies as well
as their interest groups favour the grandfathering of tradable permits.
28)
Given this situation and the at least partial conformity of employer and employees interest it
is no surprise that the industries which are to be regulated generally oppose the use of eco-
nomic environmental instruments, especially of ecological taxes.
29) Moreover, their organisa-
tions are well organised and they are important players in the political game. There are five
main reasons why these interest groups are not only better organised than environmental in-
terest groups but also better suited to achieve their self-interested goals:
(i) In contrast to environmental interest groups, the respective industry and business asso-
ciations usually have sufficient financial backing which is used for efficient lobbying.
(ii) Producers themselves are closest to the origins of environmental problems in the produc-
tion sector. This is the reason for substantial information asymmetries. Therefore, ‘green’
groups often have difficulties in getting information about pollution effects as well as
about the feasibility of alternative technologies. 
(iii) Based on this information asymmetry, industry and business associations often have con-
siderable influence on public opinion through their publications as well as through their
impact on the media.
(iv) The ‘market power’ of these interest groups is a crucial factor in the achievement of their
objectives in the political arena. It is not only important in the goods and services markets
                                                          
27. See P.L. JOSKOW, R. SCHMALENSEE, and E.M. BAILEY (1998, P. 671): “Allowances are given to existing
electric generation units and those under construction, according to fairly complicated rules ... . For our pur-
poses here it suffices to note that essentially all of the allowances were allocated ‘free’ to incumbent sources.”
A more detailed description if the initial allocation is given can be found in P.L. JOSKOW and R. SCHMALEN-
SEE (1998).
28. See for this also D.N. DEWEES (1983) as well as G.T. SVENDSEN (1999). D.N. DEWEES (1983) also points
to the fact that firms prefer measures which are more strict for new than for old plants. They might even
prefer such measures to no measures at all. 
29. There seems to have been some change of the opinion in the United States. According to G.T. SVENDSEN
(1999), private business interest groups are today more in favour of a grandfathered permit market, and no
longer so much in favour of a command and control policy, but they still reject a tax policy. – 12 –
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but in the labour market as well, especially in the form of the threat of transferring pro-
duction abroad.
(v) Quite often these associations gain personal representation in legislative institutions, in
the parliament and its committees, which makes it possible to postpone or even reject en-
vironmental issues.
Taken together, representatives of industrial and business interest groups are able to influence
legislative proposals in their early stages through active lobbying in hearings and in parlia-
mentary committees. For that purpose, they provide detailed information about environmental
measures. This has the effect of linking together lobbyists and members of the legislative
bodies. As a result of this relationship, arrangements are made between the political adminis-
trative system and ‘private’ interest groups representing business interests. In Germany, such
agreements have become common practice in more than 50 industrial committees and ‘vol-
untary self-obligations’ as well as in several hundred committees for the definition of the ‘best
available technology’.
30) 
Compared to their counterparts of business and the economy, environmentally oriented inter-
est groups are in a weak position. They have the possibility of organising spectacular actions,
a strategy which is often used by Greenpeace which might be the best known of these groups.
In doing so, in special situations they can have a strong impact on public opinion, influence
private consumption and in this way influence the policy of single companies,
31) they might
also have some impact on the decisions of voters, but they rarely have the same direct impact
on the parliamentary system and the public bureaucracy economic interest groups have.
Moreover, until the eighties the green interest groups where themselves in favour of command
and control measures in environmental policy and against the use of economic instruments.
Their main argument was the one stated in the introduction that the natural environment
should not be ‘commercialised’. Against the combined pressure of economic and environ-
mental interest groups, however, an efficient environmental policy using economic instru-
ments had no chance at all. 
2.4 The Public Bureaucracy
Already a cursory view at the available evidence tells us that – at least in Europe – many
members of the public environmental bureaucracy are in strong opposition against the appli-
cation of market based instruments of environmental policy. They rather prefer the use of
command and control. In most cases they favour, of course, policies which improve the situa-
tion of the natural environment; most members of the ‘green bureaucracies’ are highly moti-
vated to pursue this goal.
32) However, they do not necessarily favour efficient policies. More
                                                          
30. See G. MAIER-RIGAUD (1996) or J. HELBIG and J. VOLKERT (1999).
31. The best known case is that in 1995 Greenpeace succeeded in preventing Shell from sinking the oil plat-
form Brent Spar into the North See. See for this M. HUXHAM und D. SUMNER (1999).
32. For a model which employs this assumption to explain the results of international climate protection policy
see R.D. CONGLETON (1995).– 13 –
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important for them is that a policy strengthens their personal position in the environmental
policy game.
The empirical studies by K. HOLZINGER (1987) demonstrate that German environmental ad-
ministrations have at least some leeway to follow their own interests, whereas objectives such
as ‘economic efficiency’ or ‘overall economic cost optimisation’ are only of minor importance
for them. They are vitally interested in environmentally policy measures which are labour- and
resource-intensive. As a result – and in accordance with the economic theory of bureaucracy as
originally developed by W.A. NISKANEN (1968, 1971) – they are able to increase their number
of employees, and each year to have a larger budget at their disposal. The result of this is that
the environmental administrations will try to implement those environmental policy measures
which require high administrative controls. To increase their leeway they want the political
authorities to regulate as little as possible so that they have the greatest possible leeway (and
budget) for their own decisions.
33) Discretionary budgets are also necessary in order to meet the
demands of those lobbies for which the different environmental sections of German ministries
have become even more important than the parliament with its committees. 
Economic instruments and especially environmental taxes are much less attractive for the
public bureaucracy. While command and control policies can only exist with high labour
costs and other expenditures, the use of taxes requires much less expenditure and less staff.
Hence, a budget increase or a rise in the importance of environmental authorities is less likely
than with the use of standards. Furthermore, a change from the current system of environ-
mental standards to a system of taxes would require a high degree of flexibility in the envi-
ronmental agencies. 
Using taxes or tradable permits would of course reduce the information requirements of the
public environmental bureaucracy considerably. Detailed information is only necessary for
the tolerable total burden, for the ‘correct’ total emission amount derived from it, and – in the
case of taxes – on the reactions of the industries to the taxes, which can be obtained in a kind
of trial-and-error procedure by a gradual increase of the tax rate over a longer time span, but
no detailed information about the prevention costs of different producers is needed, which is
difficult to acquire. Thus, the efficiency of the bureaucracy could be increased considerably.
But this is not necessarily in the interest of the members of the bureaucracy, as the lower in-
formation requirements make it rather difficult to justify a large budget and a large staff. 
Taking all arguments together, the industries which are to be regulated and the members of
the environmental bureaucracy are the ones who are most in favour of command and control
policies, and both have a strong impact on the design of the actual policy. Thus, it comes as
no surprise that economic instruments like environmental taxes or tradable permits were
hardly used up to now. On the other hand, with respect to the extent of the environmental
program the interest of these two groups of actors are quite opposite: While the bureaucrats
favour a strict, most industries strive for a rather soft environmental policy. Thus, whether a
policy is really strict or not depends mainly on the preferences of the voters (and of the clien
                                                          
33. See the results of the surveys described in E. GAWEL (1994a, 1995).– 14 –
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tele of the party (parties) in government). Taking into account the discounting behaviour of
voters, the policy might be strict in those areas which already today have a direct, noticeable
impact, but rather loose in those areas which would mainly benefit future generations. And
this is exactly what we observe. There have been, e.g., considerable improvements in the wa-
ter quality of our lakes and rivers, but up to today there is hardly any effective policy to pre-
vent or even slow down global warming.
3 The Recent Use of New Instruments
As already mentioned in the introduction, the situation has somewhat changed in the last ten
years. In the U.S. the use of tradable permits has increased, some European countries have
taken steps towards ‘greening’ the tax system, in the Kyoto protocol the international use of
tradable permits to reduce CO2-emmissions has been negotiated, and there is an increasing
use of voluntary agreements. Thus, it appears as if the resistance against market based envi-
ronmental instruments could be overcome, even if this takes a long time. But before one is too
optimistic about this, one should analyse these developments more carefully. This is done in
the following, using again the Public Choice approach. Consequently, many arguments which
have been mentioned above will be used again.
3.1 The Ecological Tax Reforms
The main theoretical as well as empirical argument in favour of an ecological tax reform is
the hope for a double dividend: If taxes which cause distortions in one sector of the economy
are reduced and at the same time taxes which reduce distortions in another sector of the econ-
omy are introduced instead, the efficiency of the whole economy should improve and – as a
consequence – unemployment should be reduced. This idea, originally proposed by H. CH.
BINSWANGER et al. (1983) and strongly supported by D.A. PEARCE (1991) could play a key
role in reducing CO2-emissions by the introduction of a general energy and/or CO2 tax and –
on this way – in fighting global warming. In the last decade, it has become more and more
popular in Europe, not so much because of its environmental consequences but mainly be-
cause it seems to be an ideal method to solve the problems of many European labour markets
without, e.g., having to introduce more flexibility into these markets. This belief is quite
widespread despite the fact that the scientific discussion starting with A.L. BOVENBERG and
R.A. DE MOOIJ (1994) has shown that with such a reform an increase of employment while
not impossible is difficult to achieve, and that it might improve the labour market situation
somewhat, but not really solve the unemployment problem.
34) 
                                                          
34. See, e.g., the surveys in L.H. GOULDER (1995), G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998), A.L. BOVENBERG (1999), as
well as A.L. BOVENBERG and L.H. GOULDER (2002), but also the simulation studies mentioned in footnote
15 above. Comments on this debate from a Public Choice perspective are presented in G. Kirchgässner
(1998a).  – This is, of course, no argument against such a reform which still can make sense; it is an
argument against expectations of some of its proponents which are too high and which – with high
probability – will prove to be wrong.– 15 –
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This might be illustrated by simulations with computable general equilibrium models which
have been performed for several countries in recent years. Table 1 presents selected results for
Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The results for Germany show the expected results of the
first step of the ecological tax reform which became effective January 1999. It has a consider-
able effect on GDP as well as on employment but only a negligible one on CO2-Emmissions.
For Austria and Switzerland the simulations show effects of reforms which have been pro-
posed but never been implemented. In both cases, there is a considerable reduction of CO2-
Emmissions. While in Switzerland unemployment is also reduced quite a bit,
35) in Austria
there is nearly no effect on GDP and employment. In all these simulations it is assumed that
the additional revenue is used to reduce social security contributions, that the government’s
share is not increasing and that trade unions do not attempt to increase nominal wages to
compensate for increased energy prices. If these assumptions do not hold, especially if trade
unions manage to increase nominal wages, the employment effect is for all three countries
negative. Thus, these simulations demonstrated that it might be possible to design such a tax
reform in a way that unemployment decreases but that it is (politically) difficult to do so.
Table 1:   Simulation Results of ‘Ecological Tax Reforms’
Country Tax CO2-Emissions GDP Employment
Germany DM 0.02
per kWh
- 0.88 % + 0.74 % + 1.30
Austria AS 0.20
per kWh
- 9.24 % - 0.20 % + 0.13
Switzerland CHF 36.-
per ton CO2
- 8.50 % + 0.50 % - 1.00
1
Sources: H. KOSCHEL, A. WÜNSCHE and T. ECKERLE (1999, p. 8) [Germany], F. SCHNEIDER and A.M.
STIEGLBAUER (1995, p. 125) [Austria], G. KIRCHGÄSSNER, U. MÜLLER and M.-R. SAVIOZ
(1998, p. 346).
1)    Reduction of the unemployment rate (percentage points).
In many countries not only green but also (other) left-wing parties are today in favour of such
a policy, and it is also supported by trade unions. This is insofar no surprise as there is quite a
lot of evidence that left-wing parties are more active in fighting unemployment compared
with right-wing parties which are more concerned about inflation.
36) Thus, the main interest in
pursuing such a policy by left-wing (or green) parties is in many cases not a concern about the
situation of the natural environment but about the labour market, even if the expectation is
                                                          
35. The simulations are performed for the base year 1996 when the Swiss unemployment rate was 5 percent.
Unemployment is assumed to be involuntary. If – as in an other simulations – unemployment is assumed to
be voluntary, there is nearly no effect on GDP and (un)employment.
36. See, e.g., D.A. HIBBS (1977, 1992) as well as the politico-economic models of B.S. FREY and F. SCHNEI-
DER (1978, 1978a, 1979) and the survey about political business cycles by M. PALDAM (1997).– 16 –
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that it will help the environment more than the labour market: Such governments might help
the environment ‘for the wrong reason’. 
On the other hand, as already mentioned above, environmental taxes have a special attraction
for left-wing parties which traditionally aim for a higher government (tax) share because these
taxes creates revenue, which can be used to finance other projects, and the tax resistance
against ‘green taxes’ might be lower than against other taxes.
37) This is important in a situa-
tion where the current social security system and its financing is not at all sustainable and –
besides structural changes – new sources have to be found to finance it. Again, such govern-
ments might help the environment ‘for the wrong reason’.
But such a policy is strongly opposed by important interest groups from the energy intensive
industries which have to lose quite a lot by such a reform. And, as stated above, such interest
groups are very influential in the political process. In Switzerland, e.g., they successfully or-
ganised a referendum against such a reform and spent quite a lot of money in the campaign.
This certainly had an impact on the voters: On September 24, 2000, the reform was rejected
by the Swiss electorate by a majority of 55 percent. In other countries where there is no possi-
bility of a referendum against such a policy they were at least insofar successful that excep-
tions were made for the most energy intensive producing industries or even for the whole
production sector, i.e. in the latter case only consumers have to pay these taxes.
38) This im-
plies that especially those producers are exempted who produce most CO2-emissions which
strongly reduces the environmental impact of this policy. 
Thus, while these reforms might be seen as a step in the right direction, taking into account
the motives of the politicians for enforcing such a reform one has to conclude that this new
development is far away from indicating a change in the general perception about the relative
merits of command and control versus economic instruments of environmental policy and of
the political acceptance of the latter. We still have the situation that – in principle – nearly
everybody supports the use of economic instruments, but when it comes to their application
there is very strong resistance by important political actors. At best, they will be introduced
for other (non-environmental) reasons and/or in a way which is not very helpful for the envi-
ronment. But, on the other hand, it is a step in this direction and one might hope that over time
citizens become more familiar with such instruments and their advantages which might – in
the long-run – increase their acceptance in the electorate.
3.2 The Use of Tradable Permits in International Climate Policy
One might argue that there is a change at the international level. In the Kyoto process, inter-
nationally tradable permits were intended to play a major role in international environmental
policy, together with other (but related) market based instruments like ‘Joint Implementation’
and ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ projects. Thus, there seems to be an increasing willing
                                                          
37. For the discussion of this argument see, e.g., K.W. ZIMMERMANN (1996) or F. SCHNEIDER (1998).
38. See, e.g., P. EKINS and S. SPECK (1999).– 17 –
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ness to apply market based instruments. This has been forced by the United States which – up
to now – is the only country where tradable permits play a major role.
At a first glance, this seems to be an optimal solution. Global warming is a true global public
good, and the damage caused by CO2-emissions is independent of the location of the emitting
source. Thus, CO2-permits which would ensure that the price for an emitted unit is the same
all over the world are the economically most effective instrument to cope with this problem.
Moreover, as, e.g., CH. BÖHRINGER and H. WELSCH (1999) show, the use of internationally
tradable CO2-emissions permits could effectively reduce the costs of a severe reduction of
these emissions. But the main question is how to allocate the CO2-emission rights before the
trading starts? The natural way would be to distribute them per capita: each human being has
the same right to pollute the atmosphere. This would, however, result in a huge redistribution
from the North to the South. From a social point of view this might be acceptable, but it is
bare of any realism to assume that the industrial countries, especially the United States, would
ever accept such a redistribution, because this would lead to a tremendous loss of real income.
The alternative is ‘grandfathering’ to nations, where at the starting point every country gets
pollution rights according to its actual pollution. But this is totally unacceptable for the devel-
oping countries; it would largely impede their development opportunities. Moreover, an inter-
national institution (like a stock exchange) is missing which not only organises the trade but,
what is much more important, also has the power to enforce that CO2 is only emitted by a
country if it owns the necessary permits.
Thus, we are far away from solving the global warming problem with tradable permits. The
pressure of the United States to introduce such mechanisms might have been of a more sym-
bolic nature: they demanded to introduce an instrument of which they knew that, because of
the distributional problem, its implementation has no political chance. What can be done at
best at the moment is an international agreement like the Kyoto protocol where the industri-
alised countries constrain themselves to reduce their CO2-emissions and the developing
countries are allowed to somewhat increase them. If this is agreed on, tradable permits might
play a secondary though not unimportant role. But even this approach has now been rejected
by the Bush-administration: At the moment the U.S. government is not willing to accept any
reduction of its own CO2-emissions; on the contrary: its energy plans intend to increase the
burning of fossil fuels in the next years.
39) 
Moreover, to have a real effect the reductions in the industrial countries will have to be much
larger than those negotiated in the Kyoto protocol. How the different countries manage to reduce
their emissions might be up to them. Joint implementation or clean development mechanism proj-
ects might be of some help for some countries, but they can hardly be the solution of the prob-
lem, because the main reductions must take place within and not outside the industrial world.
Again, the introduction of tradable permits – if it ever happens – might be seen as a step in the
right direction, and one might hope that over time citizens (and countries) become more fa-
miliar with such instruments and their advantages, which might – in the long-run – increase
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their general acceptance. In the European countries there are still very few applications of this
instrument. In Switzerland, e.g., there is only one case, in the cantons Basel-Stadt and Basel-
Landschaft, where a system of tradable permits has been introduced. However, this was a
complete failure, as despite its theoretical possibility no trade took place at all.
40) The main
reason was that the conditions under which the trading should take place were very restrictive;
in addition the firms might have had not enough trust in this system (or in the politicians or
bureaucrats managing this system, respectively). In such situations, the use of tradable per-
mits at the international level might improve the chances for their acceptance at the national
level. But at the moment, it is still open whether these instruments will ever be applied at a
large scale at the international level at all.
3.3 The Use of Voluntary Agreements
Even when the development with respect to ecological taxes and tradable permits is taken into
account there is not very much use of these market-based environmental policy instruments
today. On the other hand, there is an increasing use of ‘voluntary agreements’ which are often
in the political discourse and in the popular press but sometimes even in the academic litera-
ture
41) also are labelled as ‘economic instruments’.
42) Is this another possibility to introduce
more market mechanisms into environmental policy?
A closer look at this instrument shows that this is definitely not the case. Voluntary agree-
ments are typically agreed on if there is a threat that otherwise the government would use
other, especially command and control measures. They are not ‘voluntary’ in the real sense of
this word, but an attempt to evade stricter environmental measures.
43) This holds the more if
the government dispenses with its other instruments, typically one of its bureaucratic meas-
ures. The advantage of these agreements is that they give more leeway to the single firms in
reaching the environmental objective, because they usually only fix a limit for the emissions
which has to be reached at a certain point of time. But the same leeway can be given to a firm
if not a voluntary agreement but a binding standard is used instead which has to be fulfilled at
a particular date. Moreover, because a voluntary agreement is no more than a (voluntary)
‘declaration of intent’ which is typically not given by the representatives of single firms but
by their interest groups, it is in no way an effective constraint for the single firms. Thus, the
government has no possibility to enforce it if it is violated. In this situation it can, of course,
use some of its traditional instruments, but then this comes with a considerable delay and pos-
sibly with a further deterioration of the environmental situation. The only possibility to make
voluntary agreements effective is to combine them from the beginning with the threat that the
government will intervene if the negotiated results will not be reached. But in this case the
voluntary agreement is actually superfluous; it is just a kind of symbolic policy.
                                                          
40. See E. STAEHELIN-WITT and A. SPILLMANN (1994).
41. See, e.g., T. SECOMBE-HETT (2000, p. 105).
42. The rhetoric used is that they are market based instruments because they are voluntary in the same way as
market transactions are voluntary.
43. For a theoretical analysis of voluntary agreements see, e.g., K. CONRAD (1998).– 19 –
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One might argue that this kind of symbolic policy might, nevertheless, improve the situation
of the environment at least somewhat because there is an additional motivation for the man-
agers of the firm which are responsible for its environmental performance to improve it. Such
an argument is in accordance with the behavioural theory of the law which states that even
mild laws, i.e. laws with low sanctions, motivate people to obey a law, even if pure self-inter-
est would tell them to violate it.
44) J.-R. TYRAN and L.P. FELD (2001) present some experi-
mental evidence which makes the interpretation possible that this effect is especially strong if
people can themselves decide whether such a law should be introduced or not. In the case of
voluntary agreements such a situation is given.
The available empirical evidence shows, however, that with a voluntary agreements generally
firms do not follow a stricter policy than they would have followed without it.
45) A significant
impact of the agreement is hardly ever observed. This is, however, not astonishing as such
‘weak incentives’ are mainly effective in ‘low-cost situations’,
46) and the typical production
decision in a firm does not fall into this category. Moreover, if there is strong competition on
a market a firm can hardly afford to implement costly measures to reduce the emissions if
their competitors do not also have to do so. In such a prisoner’s dilemma situation it is com-
pletely rational for a firm despite of the existence of such an agreement not to do more than
they would have done anyway. Only the rhetoric might change somewhat. And the leaders of
the interest groups who negotiate such an agreement will have a strong incentive to bargain
for the lowest possible level of environmental measures and to accept not more than their
member firms would have done in any case, not only because it saves costs to them but also
because this increases the possibility that the firms can reach the negotiated standard and that
afterwards this agreement can be sold to the public as a success. This can help to prevent the
government from applying strict environmental policy measures in the future as well.
That voluntary agreements can be seen as a kind of symbolic policy shows the Swiss experi-
ence with the CO2-law which combines such agreements with a tax for the case that the envi-
ronmental objective given for the year 2004 is missed. The first draft of this law made by the
government in 1997 intended to give the government the right to introduce these taxes. How-
ever, the parliament changed this part; the carbon tax can only be introduced by a decision of
the parliament. Today, it is quite obvious that the objective will not be reached. And already
now the right-wing Swiss People Party (SVP) demands that no tax will be levied even if the
environmental objective is largely missed. Thus, this law, which is then reduced to a volun-
tary agreement, will have hardly any real effect. Its existence helped, however, to organise the
campaign in 2000 against the introduction of a first step of an ecological tax reform. In this
campaign it was argued that the CO2-law was the correct and sufficient instrument to reach
the environmental objective, making an ecological tax reform allegedly superfluous. Thus,
from an ecological point of view the passing of the CO2-law might even prove to have been
counterproductive.  
                                                          
44. See, e.g., T.R. TYLOR (1990) or R.D. COOTER (1998). 
45. See for this K. RENNINGS, K.L. BROCKMANN and H. BERGMANN (1997).
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4 Concluding Remarks
Why did the patient not followed the doctor’s orders?, was the basic question of R.W. HAHN’s
(1989) seminal paper, and it is still the question this paper tries to answer. In the last thirteen
years, the situation has changed somewhat insofar as inside the United States there has been a
increasing use of tradable permits while in Europe environmental taxes, especially energy
taxes became more popular. Thus, the use of economic instruments has somewhat increased,
but its use in Europe occurred at least partly for the wrong reasons: to create additional reve-
nue was one of the main reasons to introduce and/or increase energy taxes. 
From the point of view of protecting the environment, this does not have to be considered as
only negative. The most important ecological taxes in Europe are taxes on gasoline which are
much higher compared to the U.S. This is probably the main reason why European automo-
biles need much less petrol than those produced in (and mainly for) the United States. In
Europe, these taxes have a long tradition, but 15 years ago their existence has hardly ever
been justified with environmental reasons. This has changed, of course, because today the
main reasons why an increase of these taxes is demanded (especially by green groups and
parties) are ecological ones. But – according to the arguments given above – one should care-
fully distinguish between the political rhetorics and the true reasons. In Germany, e.g., the
conservative government at the beginning of the nineties drastically increased mineral oil
taxes in order to generate additional revenue to finance the German unification.
47) And in
Switzerland, where the people accepted and increase of the mineral oil tax by 0.22 SFr in a
referendum in March 1993, one of the official reasons was to improve the situation of the en-
vironment, but the main reason was to generate additional revenue to finance the construction
of additional motorways. But whatever the ‘true’ reasons were, these tax increases definitely
had a positive effect on the environment as well. 
The small increase in the use of economic instruments of environmental policy does not in-
validate the arguments of the Public Choice approach why there is such little use of these in-
struments. As already stated by J.M. BUCHANAN and G. TULLOCK (1975), command and con-
trol are still preferred to market based instruments by the main actors in the environmental
policy game, private business (and their interest groups) and public bureaucrats. The only
novelty is that, as has been shown by G.T. SVENDSEN (1999), in the U.S. there has been some
change of the opinion towards the use of grandfathered tradable permits. The same develop-
ment might – with some delay – also happen in Europe. We might come into a situation
where governments are favouring additional taxes while private business, in order to avoid
these taxes, favour grandfathered tradable permits. Thus, even though there has been little use
of these instruments in the past, there might be some increase in the future. And, while in the
past most environmental economists gave environmental taxes better chances than tradable
permits, because the ‘licences to pollute’ might evoke moral objections, the opposite devel-
opment can occur: tradable permits might be also used in Europe at the national level and, de
                                                          
47. Between 1989 and 1995 mineral oil taxes (excluding the value added tax) increased from 0.651 DM per li-
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pending on the further development of the Kyoto process, at the international level, too. Thus,
the future of market based instruments of environmental policy does still not look bright, but
at least somewhat brighter than thirteen years ago when R.W. HAHN (1989) published his
seminal paper.
What type of institutional changes could one propose that the use of incentive orientated
environmental instruments is more attractive? The following three suggestions can be put
forward:
48)
(1) Decentralised environmental policy using the principle of subsidiary: The principle of
subsidiary should be used more intensity in environmental policy. According to this
principle, each environmental task shall be fulfilled by the smallest most decentralized
unit. Another aspect is that this principle is necessary in order to design an incentive
orientated environmental policy according to voters preferences.
(2) The use of direct voting/referenda: Even in a decentralized environmental policy, in
representative democracies the individual voter/tax payer has few possibilities to
directly influence (or even demand) incentive orientated ecological policy measures.
In a direct democracy, voters can act as agenda setters and make decisions about the
use of incentive orientated ecological instruments which are not attractive for
governments, because this use is opposed by pressure groups. This implies that
market-based ecological instruments, which are based to enforce in political
competition, have better chances to be implemented in a direct democracy.
(3) Compensation by general tax reductions: The chances for an incentive-orientated
environmental policy can be improved by compensating the additional burden of
ecological taxes and tradable permits through general tax reductions. Hence, the size
of the states public sector is not increased and voters’ resistance against ecological
policies could be reduced.
It is obvious that these three suggestions have their pros and contras but an intensive
discussion might help to generally verify which means could be used to increase market based
environmental investments.
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